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No. 74-1487
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UNITED STATES

«All~,
~V'C iS ~

Cert. to CA 9
(Hufstedler, Goodwin; dissent by
Taylor, sitting by designation)

CFH

V

CcN\f-1 ,·c.+ c>T
·
~.wae\-t~ 1iacCOLLOM

-aw

Federal/Habeas

Timely

-

1 . Sill1MARY: The SG asks for cert. to review a CA 9 ruling
that an indigent federal prisoner who is granted leave to proceed
-

- - -- - -- - - --

in forma pauperis on a 28

-

u.s.c.

§

--

CCWli,,·HMiofloil

2255 motion has a / right

to a free verbatim transcript without a particularized sho-wing
The SG states that this ruling is in direct c o n f l ~ )

·c~

with decisions in the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 10th C i r c ~

~-
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2. FACTS: In June 1970, resp. was convicted of uttering
forged currency (18

u.s.c.

472) and sentenced to ten years.

Resp. alleges that his court appointed counsel did virtually
no preparation or participation at trial and advised resp. not
to appeal his conviction

11

because it would interfere with

resp. 's motion to modify sentence." ~esp. did not a;epe9-l
and the motion to modify sentence was denied.

In March 1972,

resp, (in max. security confinement) filed a pro se paper
styled "Motion for Transcript In Forma Pauperis."

This paper

was returned by the DC with the notation that until resp.
filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the DC could not
act upon his request for a transcript.

Respo then filed

a "complaint" which the DC treated as a 2255 motion-2/

alleging

that he intended to file a§ 2255 motion but was unable to
purchase a transcript, and that he believed that the transcript
would show that there was insufficient evidence to support the
verdict and that resp. had received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Resp. contended that he was entitled to a transcript under
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 753(b) and 1915(b) (neither
relevant and neither pursued here) and that his inability
to obtain a transcript denied him due process of law.

*/ The complaint alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201
and 139l(e). Neither the DC nor the CA discussed the problem
of jurisdiction;
the SC cone ~
that there is jurisdiction
pursuant to §2255, and that the request for a transcript may
properly
be treated as ancillary to that jurisdiction (pctn at 4 n.1).
,
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\

The DC granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and appointed
counsel to representresp. in his request for a transcript.
After a hearing, the DC dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The

CA reversed by a divided vote (Hufstedler, Goodwin; Taylor)
holding that "an indigent federal prisoner, permitted to proceed
in forma pauperis, who has not yet obtained a transcript of his
criminal trial, is entitled to such a transcript, upon request in
order to assist him in the preparation of a postconviction motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." (petn. at 19a, footnote omitted).
Rehearing en bane was denied, with five judges dissenting
(Wright, Trask, Choy, Wallace, Sneed).
The majority CA opinion, noting that it was addressing
the question reserved in Wade v. Wilson, 396 U.S. 282, 286 (1970),
recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) provides funding for a free
transcript in§ 2255 motions only where "the trial judge or a
circuit judge certifies that the suit or appeal is not frivolous
and that the transcript is needed to decide the issue presented ·
by the suit or appeal."

It reasoned that the "not frivolous"

determination was satisfied by the grant of leave to proceed
in forma pauperis (citing Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S.
438 (1962)), and that although the statute requires a particularized
showing of need, Supreme Court cases decided since the passage
of§ 753(f) have undermined this requirement (citing Britt v.
'North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 228 (1971); Gardner v. California,
393 U.S. 367 (1969); and Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282
(1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).

In rul:i.,ng that the Supreme

-4.,.

\

cases
Courtlestablish a constitutional right to a transcript
upon a showing that the moti n is not frivolous---: the CA stated
that it was merely filling a "constitutional deficit not
addressed by the statute."
The CA also discussed and rejected the government's argument
(taken from United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir.
1964)) that: "In collateral proceedings • • • most of the trial

errors warranting attention in direct appeals are not reviewable
• • •. • The usual grounds for successful collateral attacks upon
convictions arise out of occurrences outside of the courtroom or
of events in the courtroom of which the defendant was aware and
can recall without the need of having his memory refreshed by
reading a transcript or a partial transcript to support some
ground of c6llateral attack •

o

• "

In answer to the argument that its ruling will he
unduely expensive, the CA notes that almost all indigents
who appeal get transcripts (always when counsel changes, often

-----

when trial counsel is counsel on appeal), that around 90% of

--

defendants plead guilty (resulting in an inexpensive transcript),
and that of those few prisoners who have neither pleaded guilty
nor appealed, not all will wish to file a§ 2255 motion.
These factors, says the CA, mean that its ruling is not
unduely costly.

l

It also notes that the cost to the government

of opposing a motion for a transcript often exceeds the cost
df the transcript, see Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. at 279 n.l.

-5>

In ruling that the indigent federal prisoner need only
show that his claim is not frivolous, the CA noted that
it is in conflict with four other Circuits (see Benthiem v. United
States, 403 F.2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 945 (1969); United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th
Cir. 1964); Cowan v. United States, 445 F.2d 855 (5th Cir.
1971); Bentley v. United States, 431 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 920 (1971)--- to which the SG adds
two more Circuits, see Culbert v. United States, 325 F.2d
920 (8th Cir. 1964); Martinez v. United States, 344 F.2d 325
(10th Cir. 1965)).

The CA also noted that it was departing

from earlier CA 9 rulings, see Wilson v. Wade, 390 F.2d
632 (9th Cir. 1968), vacated and remanded, 396 UoS. 282 (1970).
One sidelight~ the majority opinion specifically reserved
the question whether the government is required to provide

1

a transcript to an indigent who has been convicted but is no
longer in prison.

(Petn at 19a n.9).

The dissent argues that the decision is contrary to
existing case law (discussing only the prior 9th Cir. law),
and that an indigent prisoner ·who has chosen not to appeal
should not need a transcript to know whether he has a particularized
§ 2255 claim.

The dissent also states that since the complaint

was brought as a declaratory judgment action (but see footnote
page 2, supra ) for SG's concession of§ 2255 jurisdiction),
there is a sovereign immunity question whether the DC can
order the printing of a free transcript in the absence of
statutory authorization. This problem is solved if the ruling
i$ that the sentence will be vacated unless a transcript is provided.
•'

-6-

The dissent from denial of rehearing en bane states
that an indigent is entitled to no more than an average
defendant (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974),
and asserts

the belief that the average defendant would

not purchase a transcript "in order to comb through it for
~

possible error." (Petn. at 24a-25a).

.............

The dissent from

~

denial of rehearing en bane also objects

to the panel's

departure from prior 9th Cir. case law, stating that
intervening Supreme Court cases did not undercut the earlier
reasoning.
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that cert. should be
granted (1) because there is now a conflict between the
9th Cir. and the 1st, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 10th Circuits;
(2) because the 9th Cir. decision will have substantial
practical consequences in that it will require much court reporter
time for the preparation of transcripts; (3) because the
decision is in conflict with the requirements of the statute;
and (4) because the SG believes that the 9th Cir. is wrong on
the merits.
On the merits, the SG argues first that the government
is required only to give the prisoner an "adequate opportunity"
to present his claims (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (197~)),
and that the prisoner is provided that opportunity in his
right to receive a transcript on appeal.

The SG states that

collateral attack is different from, and more limited than

lj

appeal, and that therefore the indigent prisoner who choses

-7-
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not to appeal may fairly be required to make a showing of
particularized need.

The SG stresses that many errors for

which a transcript is useful must be raised on appeal or not
at all.

Second, the SG argues that the investigation into

particularized need is no more than the "average" prisoner
would make before going to the expense of ordering a transcript.
The SG also states that this prisoner needed only to tell the
court why he believed he was denied effective assistance of
counsel (stating that insufficiency of the evidence is
not cognizable on collateral attack unless the prisoner is
alleging that there was no evidence to support the conviction,
citing Ga~er _y. f.'.ouJ:si_~na, 368 U.S. 157 (1961)), and that this
requirement of a showing of need is not an undue burden.
The response argues that the CA opinion should be
read narrowly, to apply only where the non-frivolous
motion alleges incompetence of counsel or lack of sufficiency
of the evidence, both of which require a transcript to be
properly argued and presented for review.

Respo states that

all of the other CA decisions are distinguishable, and thus
there is no conflicto

Resp. echoes the CA majority in arguing

that there are no serious practical consequences of the CA
opinion~

Finally, Resp. states his belief that the CA was

right on the merits, and suggests the contrary result would
raise constitutional problems such as conflict with the
~uspension of habeas clause.

Resp. does not engage in any

detailed discussion of the merits.

-8-

..

4. DISCUSSION: There is a conflict in the Circuits.
Resp. notes that all of the cases cited by the SG are
from before Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971),
but cites no indication that the circuits are reconsidering
their earlier decisions.

Although resp.'s view of the narrow

holding of the case suggests some interesting ways of reaching
a limited holding that resp. is entitled to a transcript,
the 9th Circuit clearly viewed its decision as having
broader effect, and some of the cases in conflict are not
distinguishable even from the narrow holding (..§..:_g_. Culbert v.
United States, 325 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1964) is directly on
point, and the PC in Cowan v. United States, 445 F.2d 855
(5th Cir. 1971) certainly seems to lay down a blanket rule).
('-._../

Respo appears correct in his statement that the CA ruling will
not have a staggering impact on the criminal justice system,
but federal prisoners will be treated measurably differently .
There is a response.
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UNITED STATES
Motion for Appointment
of Counsel

v.
Mac COLLOM

On October 6, 1975, the Court granted resp's Motion for leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and the SG' s petn for cert to__.9 A .,9~ to consider whether a prisone r
proceeding in forma pauperis on a § 2255 Motion has a right to a free, verbatim
transcript without a particularized showing of need.

This is resp's request tha t

John A. Strait, Esq. be appointed to represent him in this Court.
Mr. Strait served as resp's appointed counsel under the Criminal Justice
Act in both the DC and the CA.

Counsel's appellate experience includes preparati on

-

2 -

and submission of briefs in this Court as well as state and federal courts belo,v.
I

~

Mr. Strait is a member of the bar of this Court.
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Re:
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Dear Bill:
In due course I propose to circulate a dissent
which will not reach the constitutional question
decided in Paft III of your opinion.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

,.

.-..

Copies to the Conference

•.

;
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j5u:p-rnttt (!Jcurt cf tlrt ~nitth j5tatts
~asllingfott, ~. QI. 20pJ~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 14, 1976

I

,,
,.·,

I

..

Re:

I,.

,,

?

,·

No. 74-1487 - United States v. MacCollom

...

Dear Bill:

,.

I shall await John's dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

.,...

-·.
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Copies to Conference

,
,l

.

. ,,

~tmt C!fttttrl of tqt ~ h ~taln'
~as-lftttghm. to.

<q.

20ffe'!,

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

May 18, 1976

No. 74-1487 - United States v. MacCollom

Dear Bill:
I, too, shall wait for John 1 s dissent in this case.

Sincerely,

,·
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

•,

~tntt

C!Jcmi o-f tqt ~ttitt~ .i'htlttt
C!J. 211.;r'!,

;

--rut~. ~-

CHAMBERS OF

May 21, 1976

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 74-1487

-

United States v. MacCollom

Dear Bill:
I have now decided to concur in the judgment, but I am
writing separately and briefly.

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

The Conference

C!Jourt of tl1t 'J)liritrb .;%,tat.ts

~ltlrtl'utt

'Ulcts iiingtmt,

"!3. <4.

2flffeJ~~

, ,.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN, JR.

May 27, 1976

I
RE : No .74-1487

.

Unit ed States v. MacCollom

Dear John:
Please join me in your fine dissent in the above .
Time permitting I may add a few words of my own addressing the constitutional question.

Sincerely,

-.

-~ .:

Mr. Justice Stevens

..•'
~

cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

May 27, 1976

Re:

74-1487 - United States v. MacCollom

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
In rejoinder to Bill's response in his memorandum
of May 27, 1976, I propose to add the following as a new
footnote on page 4 right after the citation of Coppedge.

Sin}[

Attachment

I

No. 74-1487 - United States v. MacCollom
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Although I have described that right as "almost" the
equivalent of the absolute right to a full transcript on direct
appeal, the difference between the two is significant. Before
Congress amended§ 753(f) to provide for automatic availability
of transcripts, Pub. L. 91-545, 84 Stat. 1412, the statute
already authorized transcripts for indigent appellants, 28 U.S.C.
§ 753(f) (1964 ed., Supp. V)] but, under Coppedge, supra, at
446, the appellant was only entitled to a transcript sufficient
to determine nonfrivolousness. The fact that Congress amended
the statute to give the appellant the right to a complete transcript demonstrates (a) that Congress was aware of this difference, and (b) that recognition of a right in a§. 2255 context
which is only "almost" as valuable as the right on direct appeal
is consistent with the intent of Congress.

To: The Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Marsh1.ll
Mr. Justice Blac1anun
Mr. Justice Po ,ell
Mr. Justice Stevens

From: Mr. Justice R•hnquist

-=_
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

l. . .
No. 74-1487

United States,
Petitioner,

v.

Colin F. MacCollom.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Umted
States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit.

[May -, 1976]
MR. JUSTICE R EHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
This case presents the question of whether the restrictions imposed by 28 U. S. C. § 753 on the availability to an indigent prisoner of a free trial transcript to
aid him in preparing a petition for collateral relief are
consistent with the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
cop trast to ever;y other court of appeals which has ruled
on the issue, held that such prisoners have an abso·
lute right to a transcript. We reverse

I
Respondent was convicted of uttering forged currency
in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 842 after a jury trial in the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington. On June 4, 1970, he was sentenced to 10
years' imprisonment. He did not appeal. Nearly two
years later respondent, acting pro se, filed in the District
Court a paper designated "Motion for Transcript in
Forma Pauperis." This was returned to respondent
with the advice that he must first file a motion pursuant
to 28 U. S. C. § 2255 before the court could act on his:
request for a transcript

74-1487-0PINTON
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Respondent then filed a "complaint for Declaratory
Judgment and Injunctivl:l Relief" in which he alleged
that he "intends to move this Court for vacation of his
sentence pursuan.t to 28 U. S. C. § 2255." He asserted
that he was unable to afford a transcript, that a transcript would show .that he had not been afforded effective
assistance of counsel and that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict of guilty. The complaint
further alleged that without a transcript respondent
would be "unable to frame his arguments for fair and
effective review." The complaint did not elaborate upon
respondent's two asserted grounds for relief.
'
The District Court treated this pleading as a motion
under 28 U. S. C. § 2255, granted respondent leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, appointed counsel, and held
a hearing. After the hearing the court dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. Respondent appealed, and a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, MacCollom v.
United States, 511 F. 2d 1116 (CA9 1974), holding that
respondent was entitled to a transcript "in order to assist
him in the preparation of a post-conviction motion under
28 U. S. C. 2255."

II
Congress has expressly addressed the question of furnishing transcripts at public expense in 28 U. S. C. § 753
(f), which provides in pertinent part :
". . . Fees for transcripts furnished in criminal
proceedings to persons proceeding under the Criminal Justice Act ( 19 U. S. C. 3006A), or in habeas
corpus proceedings to persons allowed to sue, defend,
or appeal in forma pauperis, shall be paid by the
United States out of moneys appropriated for those
purposes. Fees for transcripts furnished in proceedings brought under section 2255 of this title,

74-1487-0PINION
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to petsons permitted to sue or appeal in forma pauperis shall be paid by the United States out of
'money apropriated for that purpose if the trial
j~
ertifies that the suit or appeal is not frivolous
~ d that tlie transcript is needed to decide the issue
presented by the suit or appeal. . . ."

~

The statute thus provides for a free transcript for
indigent prisoners asserting a claim under § 2255 if a
judge certifies that the asserted claim is "not frivolous"
and that the transcript is "needed to decide the issue."
The District Court, by its conclusion that respondent
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted
implicitly decided one of these two issues against
respondent.
The Court of Appeals held that it was not necessary
to declare § 753 (f) unconstitutional in order to grant
respondent relief. Rather the court held that the section "does not prohibit courts from .. . requiring the
government to supply an imprisoned indigent with a
free transcript before he files a § 2255 motion. Such
a construction would fill a constitutional defect not addressed by the statute." (Emphasis added.) 511 F. 2d,
at 1119.
This is a novel approach to statutory construction.
The general rule is that the expenditure of public funds·
is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that
public funds may be expended unless prohibited by
Congress. Reeside v. Walker, 11 How. 272, 291 (1851).
This particular statute contains a limited grant of authority to the courts to authorize the expenditure of public funds for furnishing transcripts to plaintiffs in § 2255
actions. The fact that the statute does not "prohibit'r
the furnishing of free transcripts in other circumstancesis of little significance, since most such statutes speak
only in terms of granting authority for the expenditure

74-1487---0PINION
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of federal funds. Where Congress has addressed the
subject as it has here, and authorized expenditures where
a condition is met, the clear implication is that where
the condition is not met, the expenditure is not
authorized. Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U. S.
282, 289 (1929); Passenger Corp. v. Passenger Assn., 414
u. s. 453, 458 (1974).1
It is true, as respondent observes, that the statute,
as currently written, distinguishes between habeas cor~
pus petitioners and parties proceeding under § 2255 in
that only the latter must make a showing of need and
non-frivolousness in order to obtain a free transcript.
Thus while it is still true that the "remedy" afforded
by § 2255 is "exactly commensurate with that which
had previously been available by habeas corpus. . . ."
Hill v. United States, 368 U. S. 424, 427 (1962), the
right to pursue that remedy with a free transcript has
now been somewhat limited by Congress. 2 Respondent
1 Our Brother STEVENS would construe the pertinent part of
§ 753f to 'make transcripts available almost automatically in § 2255
proceedings .. .', post, p. 4. We think such a construction would
do violence to the intent of Congress which clearly appears from
the language of that section, ante, pp. 2-3. Congress did in that
section make transcripts a,vailable automatically on direct appeal,
but in the same section limited their availability m § 2255 motions
to cases where the trial judge certifies that the § 2255 suit is not
frivolous and that the transcript is needed to decide the issue
presented by the suit. Our Brother STEVENS advances what may
well be very sound policy reasons for furmshing free transcripts
as a matter of course to § 2255 plamtiffs, as well as to convicted
defendants pursuing direct appeals. But 1t 1s plain from a reading
of § 75,3.f that these considerations have not yet commernrd them- 1·
selves to Congress.
t--___--2 The difference is not as great as it might appear to be, however, because habeas corpus petitioners who wish to proceed in
Jorma pauperis must still overcome a "non-frivolous" barrier under
28 U. S. C, § 1915. E . g., Kitchens v. Alderman, 376 F 2d .26~

A
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argues that this constitutes a suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus in violation of Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the
Constitution.
This argument presupposes, inter alw, that a right to
a free transcript is a necessary concommitant of the writ
which the founders declared could not be suspended.
This is obviously not the case. The writ of habeas corpus operated until 1944 with no provision for free transcripts for indigents. See 58 Stat. 5, 6 (1944) (28 U.S. C.
§ 9a (1940 ed. Supp. IV)). Congress, when in that year
it authorized free transcripts for the first time, could
certainly have limited the authorization to nonfrivolous
cases where a need had been shown. If Congress could
have thus limited the writ directly without "suspending"
it, it follows that it may do so indirectly. The only possible objection is a Fifth Amendment due process-equal
protection claim to which we now turn.

III
The Court of Appeals did not technically decide this
constitutional issue, since it thought it had discovered a
lacuna in the statute, but its reference to a "constitutional defect" suggests its view on this question. Respondent urges that if the statute is read we now read
it, it violates both the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and his right "to equal protection."
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does
not establish any right to an appeal, see Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U. S. 12, 18 ( 1956), and certainly does not establish
any right to collaterally attack a final judgment of conviction.3 In this case respondent was granted a statu(CA5 1967) , Bl,air v. People of State of California, 340 F. 2d 741
(CA9 1965) .
8 The constitutional treatment of habeas eorpus , of course, is not
contained in the Due Process Clau;;e but in Art. I , § 9, cl. 2, of the
Constitution.

I
f
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tory right of appeal without payment of costs if he
were an indigent, and had he pursued that right section
753 (f) would have authorized the use of public funds
to furnish him a transcript of the trial proceedings without any further showing on his part. Having foregone
this right, which existed by force of statute only, he may
not several years later successfully assert a due process
right to review of his conviction and thereby obtain a
free transcript on his own terms as an ancillary constitutional benefit. · The conditions which Congress had
imposed on obtaining such a transcript in § 753 (f)
are not "so arbitrary and unreasonable as to require their
invalidation," Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 365
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); rather they "comport
with fair procedure," Douglas, supra, at 357.
Although the statutory conditions established in § 753"
(f) with respect to furnishing a free transcript to movants in § 2255 proceedings are therefore consistent with
the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment, it
is undoubtedly true that they place an indigent in a
somewhat less advantageous position than a person of
means. But neither the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, nor the counterpart equal protection requirement embodied in the Fifth Amendment,
guarantees "absolute equality or precisely equal advantages," San Antonio Independent Schools District ·V.
Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 24 ( 1973). In the context of a
criminal proceeding they require only "an adequate opportunity to present [one's] claim fairly . . . ." Ross
·v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 616 (1974) .
.-In Douglas v. California, supra, the Court held that
the State must provide counsel for an indigent on his
first appeal as of right. But in Ross v. Moffitt, supra,
we declined to extend that holding to a discretionary
s.econd appeal from an intermediate appellate court to

"

·.
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the Supreme Court of North Carolma. We think the
distinction between these two holdings of the Court is
of considerable assistance in resolving respondent's equal
protection claim. Respondent in this case had an opportunity for direct appeal, and had he chosen to pursue
it he would have been furnished a free transcript of the
trial proceedings. But having foregone that right, and
instead some years later seeking to obtain a free transcript in order to make the best case he can in a proceeding under § 2255, respondent stands in a different
position.
The Court has held that when a State grants a right
to collateral review, it may not deny the right to an indigent simply because of inability to pay the required filing fee, Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961). There is
no such impediment here; respondent was permitted to
proceed in f orma pauperis in his § 2255 action. The
Court has also held that a State may not confide to the
public defender the final decision as to whether a transcript shall be available to the criminal defendant who
collaterally attacks his conviction, Lane v. Brown, 372
U. S. 477 (1963). There the Court observed that the
state provision "confers upon a state officer outside the
judicial system power to take from an indigent all hope
of any appeal at all ." 372 U. S., at 485.
The congressional statute governing the furnishing of
free transcripts to plaintiffs in § 2255 actions has no such
infirmity. The decision as to the provisions of the transcript at public expense is made initially by an official
at the very heart of the judicial system-a district judge
in the judicial district in which the § 2255 plaintiff was
tried. The district court has the power to order a free
transcript furnished if he finds that the "suit ... is not
frivolous and that the transcript is needed to decide
the issue presented •.•. " 28 U. S. C. § 753 (f).

74-1487-0PINION
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We think that the formula devised by Congress satisfies the equal protection components of the Fifth Amendment. Respondent chose to forego his opportunity for
direct appeal with its attendant unconditional free transcript. This choice affects his later equal protection
claim as well as his due process claim. Equal protection does not require the Government to furnish to the
indigent a delayed duplicate of a right of appeal with
attendant free transcript which it offered in the first
instance, even though a criminal defendant of means
might well decide to purchase such a transcript in pursuit of relief under § 2255. The basic question is one
of a.dequacy of respondent's access to procedures for
review of his conviction, Ross v. Moffitt, supra, and it
must be decided in the light of avenues which respondent
chose not to follow as well as those he now seeks to
· widen. We think it enough at the collateral relief stage
that Congress has provided that the transcript be paid
for by public funds if one demonstrates that his § 2255
claim is not frivolous, and that the transcript is needed
to decide the issue presented.
Respondent urged in oral argument that if trial counsel
· had done a poor job of representing a criminal defendant,
such counsel might well urge the defendant to forego
his right of appeal in order to prevent a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel from being raised on the appeal. It is certainly conceivable that such a state of
facts might exist, notwithstanding the fidelity to the
interest of their clients demonstrated repeatedly by the
overwhelming majority of the members of the legal profession. But § 753 (f) does not require that a § 2255
plaintiff must prove his claim in order to obtain a transcript, but only that he convince the district court that
such claim is not frivolous. Had the District Court
nere not been confronted with not merely a conclusory-
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1:1,llegations but with some factual allegations indicating
a denial of respondent's Sixth Amendment right to,
counsel, together with an additional explicit assertion
that trial counsel had urged respondent to forego his;
appeal, that court might have concluded that such a
claim was not frivolous, and further decided that a free
transcript should be furnished pursuant to § 753 (f). 4
But that is not our case. Respondent made only a
naked allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Since any discussion he may have had with his triaI
counsel as to the desirability of appeal would not normally appear in the transcript of proceedings at trialr
the furnishing of such transcript would not have aided
him in refreshing his recollection of such discussions.
The failure to flesh out this aspect of respondent's claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, then, is not likely
to have been cured by a transcript.
We think this is an area of the law where the opinions
of the courts of appeals are entitled to particularweight, since they represent not only expositions of
federal and constitutional law, but also expressions of
essentially practical judgment on questions which those
courts must confront far more than we do. The fact
that with the exception of the decision presently under
review they have unanimously concluded that the conditions established by § 753 (f} for the furnishing of a
free transcript do not violate the Fifth Amendment issignificant.5 A practical reason for their conclusion is
Since a § 2255 claim is usually pre~entrd to the trial judge he
will likely have an independent recollcrtion of counsel's performance
which may well lead him to conclude that a movant's claim is·
nonfrivolous
5 E. g., Ellis v. State of Maine, 448 F. 2d 1325
(CAl 1971);
United States ex rel. Buford v. Henderson, 524 F. 2d 147 (CA2
1975) ; United State& 'll . Shoaf, 341 F . 2d 832 (CA4 1964); United'
4
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well expressed by Judge Haynsworth in United States v.
Shoaf, 341 F. 2d 832 (CA4 1964), in which he said for
that court :
"The usual grounds for successful collateral attacks
upon convictions arise out of occurrences outside
of the courtroom or of events in the courtroom of
which the defendant was aware and can recall without the need of having his memory refreshed by
reading a transcript. He may well have need of a
transcript ( to support his claim) but rarely, if
ever, ... to become aware of the events or occurrences which constitute a ground for collateral attack." 341 F. 2d, at 835. 6
We conclude that the fact that a transcript was available had respondent chosen to appeal from his conviction, and remained available on the conditions set forth
in § 753 to an indigent proceeding under § 2255, afforded
respondent an adequate opportunity to attack his conviction. To hold otherwise would be to place the indigent defendant in a more favorable position than a
similarly situated prisoner of some, but not unlimited,
means, who presumably would make an evaluation much
like that prescribed in § 753 (f) before he spent his own
funds for a transcript.
" ... [T]he fact that a particular service might be
of benefit to an indigent defendant does not mean
that the service is constitutionally required. The
States v. Herrara, 474 F. 2d 1049 (CA5 1973) ; Hoover v. United
States, 416 F. 2d 432 (CA6 1969); United States ex rel. Nunes v.
Nelson, 467 F. 2d 1380 (CA9 1972) (habeas corpus); Taylor v.
United States, 238 F . 2d 409 (CA9 1956) (§ 2255 motion); Hines
v. Baker, 422 F. 2d 1002 (CAlO 1970) .
6
This op1mon and othn aspects of th1~ quest10n were thoroughly
discussed shortly after the 1965 amendment to § 753 (f) in Blackmun, In Forma Paupe-ns Appeals, 43 F . R D a43 (1967) .
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duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate
the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by
a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse
his conviction, but only to assure the defendant of
an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly
in the context of the State's appellate process."
Ross v. Moffitt, supra, at 616.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit is
Reversed.
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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I join my Brother Stevens'
to record my disagreement with the Court's holding tha~

e

ment' s refusal to furnish an indigent defendant a free trial transcript

~·'.

in a proceeding under 28 U.S. C. § 2255, upon merely a showing of
indigency, does not deny respondent Equal Protection of the law secured
against the federal government, as the Court concedes1 through the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 87 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2 (1975).
"(T]he central aim of our entire judicial system (is that] all
people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned,

1

stand

on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court, "'
Griffinv. Illinois, 351 U.S.

12, 17 (1956), for this is a "country

dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special privileges to none
in the administration of its criminal law."

Id.; at 19.

"Our decisions

for more than a decade now have made clear that differences in access
to the instruments needed to vindicate legal rights, when based upon
the financial situation of the defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution.

11

·.
Roberts v. La Vallee, 389 U. S. 40, 42, ( 1967).

Thus, in Griffin, the
r.

Court held that "[d]estitute defendants must be afforded as adequate
appellate review as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts,

11

~

•..
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that
351 U. S., at 19, and/therefore the State must furnish the indigent
defendant with a free trial transcript for purposes of direct appeal.
The Griffin principle of equality was not limited to transcripts
for purposes of direct appellate review.

In Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S.

708 (1961), the Court invalidated a filing fee for state habeas corpus
as applied to indigents.

The invalidation was held to be required by

an earlier decision holding that a State could not require an indigent
to pay a filing fee before being allowed to appeal in one of its courts.
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).

Later, Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
•',

477, 484 (1963), held that "Smith makes clear that the Griffin principle
also applies to state collateral proceedings • . . . "
The Griffin equality principle was next applied to require that
a State supply a free transcript to an indigent who brought a state
collateral procedure.

In Long v. District Court, 385 U.S.

192 ( 1966),

the Court, stating that "having established a post-conviction procedure,
a State cannot condition its availability to an indigent upon any financial
consideration,

11

held that an indigent defendant must be furnished a free

transcript in state habeas proceedings for purposes of appeal from a
denial of that relief.

And in Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 ( 1969),

the Court went still further and required the furnishing of a transcript
of a habeas proceeding for the purposes of a second such proceeding.
Thus, the Court's holding today that respondent may be required to
' show more than indigency before being entitled to his trial transcript

j

- 3 -

for purposes of collateral review is a plain departure from Griffin
and its progeny.
The denial in this case is particularly egregious, for one of
respondent's claims on the merits was that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel.

Substantiation of such a claim is virtually

impossible without the aid of a trial transcript.

Yet the Court deni-

grates respondent's claim as a "naked allegation.

11

Slip opinion, at 8.

Essentially, therefore, he is denied a transcript for making an
unsubstantiated allegation, an allegation that obviously he cannot

1/
establish without a transcript.
It bears emphasis . that where, as here, denial of equal protection
is the issue, it matters not, under our cases, that the indigent had a
fair opportunity to present a defense and have his conviction reviewed
on direct appeal.

The unfairness born of discrimination denying equal

protection is as offensive to the Constitution as any unfairness resulting
from procedural deficiencies in the criminal system.

Thus, I cannot

accept the Court's argument that respondent could constitutionally be
denied a free transcript because

11

[r ]espondent in this case had an

opportunity for direct appeal, and had he chosen to pursue it he would
have been furnished a free transcript of the trial proceedings." Slip
opinion, at 6.

The Constitution demands that respondent, despite his

·•

indigency, be afforded the same opportunity for collateral review of

2/
his conviction as the nonindigent:- "If [the Government] has a general

•

I
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policy of allowing [collateral relief], it cannot make lack of means an
effective bar to the exercise of this opportunity.

The [Government)

cannot keep the word of promise to the ear of those illegally convicted
and break it to their hope.

11

Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 24 (Frankfurter,

J. , concur ring in the judgment).
The Court's reliance upon Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 619
(1974), for the proposition that "[i)n the context of a criminal proceeding
[equal protection) require [s] only 'an adequate opportunity to present his _
claims fairly"' is patently misplaced.

This quote from Ross, read in

context, speaks not merely to equality of opportunity in the overall
criminal process, but also to equality of opportunity at any stage of the
process where

. the validity of the defendant's restraint

or conviction is the _primary consideration.
I reject as wholly fallacious the argument that adequacy of
opportunity to present claims at trial and on direct appeal so far
diminishes the importance of collateral review, that discrimination
between indigent and nonindigent in post- conviction proceedings is
constitutionally tolerable.

That argument is i:rp.plicitly if not explicitly

rejected in the unbroken line of our decisions that make no distinction,
for purposes of equal protection analysis, between collateral proceedings
and trials and direct appeals.

Any distinction must necessarily be

constitutionally intolerable where the stakes are no less than the
constitutionality of a criminal conviction.

Any distinction would also .

1,

<

- 5 be plainly inconsistent with the explicit recognition given habeas corpus
in Art. I, §9, Cl. 2 of the Constitution.
399-403 (1963).

See F~ v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,

And for federal prisoners, "history makes clear that

§2255 was intended to afford prisoners a remedy identical in scope to
federal habeas corpus."

Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (197 4).

Today's decision and others this Tenn such as United States v.
Mandujano, _ _ U.S. ___ (1976), empty of all promise the Court's
assurance only six years ago that decisions applying Griffin "have
pointedly demonstrated that the passage of time has heightened rather
than weakened the attempts [by this Court] to mitigate the disparate
treatment of indigents in the criminal process."
399 U.S. 235, 241 (1970).

I dissent.

Williams v. Illinois,
,,.

'',

":-:'•

.

,,

1~'

I

I

"

....

;

.

I

Respondent's oth~r allegation was insufficiency of the
evidence.

Two of our decisions plainly indicate that this alle-

gation suffices to require provision of a verbatim transcript.
\-•,.

See Maye1:_v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Draper v.
W£>.shington, supra.

Mayer also indicated that an allegation of
'·.

,.

prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct, 404 U.S., at 198, also requires provision of a transcript.

That claim, for purposes of

substantiation on appeal or collateral review,is like respondent' s
first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Mayer, 404 U.S.,

.... ,

at 195, held that where the grounds of appeal are insufficiency of
the evidence and prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant need only
"make out a colorable need for a complete transcript" in order to
be entitled to it.

]:.I

Indeed, in Burns v. Ohio, supra, a filin~ fee for direct appeals

was held invalid as applied to indigent even though the indigent petitione r
there had already received one appellate review of his conviction.

As

·•·,·.

the Court then stated:
·'·"·

··'

";',I

"[T]he State argues that petitioner received one appellate
review of his conviction in Ohio, while in Griffin, Illinois
had left the defendant without any judicial review of his
conviction.

This is a distinction without a difference for,

as Griffin holds, once the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents
from access to any phase of that procedure because of their
poverty."

'·;.'

,(

360 U.S., at 252.
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